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The Allocation of Prosecution: An Economic Analysis 
Legal systems include a wide variety of behavior-controlling 
laws. Violations of such laws are generally classified as torts (e.g., 
noncriminal defamation), crimes (e.g., drug offenses), or both torts 
and crimes (e.g., battery and criminal fraud). Two principal aims 
of a legal system are the punishment and deterrence of those who 
commit crimes or ,torts (offenders), and the redress of injuries suf-
fered by crime or tort victims. In attempting to redress injuries, le-
gal systems create causes of action and establish courts to adjudicate 
the actions so that the victims themselves can seek peaceful redress. 
In attempting to punish and deter, legal systems rely upon "prose-
cutors" to bring actions against offenders. 
For legal wrongs that are noncriminal, .the "prosecutor" is the 
victim, and the method of prosecution is the action brought by the 
victim to seek redress. The offender is punished by being forced 
to reimburse the victim, and potential offenders are deterred by the 
possibility that the victims of any future offenses will bring actions 
against them. For wrongs •that are criminal, the government prose-
cutes the offender in an action to punish the offender and deter the 
commission of future offenses. This action is generally separate 
from the action available to the victim, if any, to seek redress.1 
This Note uses economic theory to reassess the division of prose-
cutorial tasks between victims and the government for offenses other 
than victimless offenses. It attempts to answer in a general manner 
questions such as why the prosecutor should differ from offense to 
offense and where ,the line should be drawn between governmental 
and individual prosecution. Work done in the areas of welfare eco-
nomics and public finance concerning the effectiveness of govern-
ment and the private sector in providing different sorts of goods is 
drawn upon heavily. This Note views prosecution as an economic 
good and a victim's prosecution of an offender as a market activity. 
First, it delineates an economic theory of prosecution and constructs 
two models for distinguishing offenses on the basis of their suitability 
for public prosecution or for public subsidy of individual prosecution. 
Then, the conclusions drawn from these models are employed to de-
termine whether five common offenses are better suited for govern-
mental rather than individual prosecution. 
I. THE ECONOMIC THEORY 
Welfare economics is a normative discipline that attempts to de-
1. This Note assumes that, as a general rule, all offenses currently prosecuted 
criminally by government could also be prosecuted by the victim. But cf. text at 
notes 16-19 infra. 
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termine in a detailed manner what improves social welfare in some 
sense. One might attempt to make such a determination by accu-
rately comparing individual utilities. For example, one might con-
sider whether, if A is forced to give a dollar to B, B has gained more 
than A has lost. Yet such comparisons are difficult to make. To 
avoid making them, most economic theory employs a criterion of op-
timality in social welfare that requires only those resource realloca-
tions that improve the welfare of some individuals without impairing 
the welfare of others. An optimal position is reached when no ac-
tion can be taken to improve the welfare of some individual without 
impairing the welfare of others. This criterion, called pareto opti-
mality, is often the sole criterion of efficiency used by economists2 
and will be the sole one used in this Note. 
It can easily be shown that a perfectly competitive market deal-
ing in purely private goods is efficient by this criterion. 3 "Purely 
private goods" are goods, services, or activities that do not generate 
externalities. That is, they do not impose costs or benefits on those 
not involved in transactions concerning the "goods." When such 
costs or benefits are imposed, "externalities" are said to exist. For 
instance, external benefits arise when A pays someone to mow his 
lawn; his neighbors now live in a neater environment. External 
costs occur when B's auto factory emits pollutants into 1he air; those 
living around the factory suffer breathing discomfort and long-term 
health problems. In each of these examples, costs or benefits arise 
that are ex-ternal to the market transactions taking place. 
A market in goods that generate externalities is generally ineffi-
cient according to the pareto-optimality criterion. This can be dem-
onstrated by the auto factory example. Suppose that it would cost 
B $500 in lost profits to stop polluting by shutting down his factory 
and that the damage to the people living around the factory from 
the pollution totals $1000, $10 apiece for 100 people. The factory's 
continued production clearly is not pareto optimal. If the 100 peo-
ple collectively paid a "bribe" of $500 to B to stop producing, B's 
doing so would make them better off without detracting from his 
welfare. 
The factory's production is nevertheless likely to continue, for 
the 100 people are not likely to organize and pay the bribe. Theo-
retically, each individual should be willing to contribute up to $10 
for the bribe. The bribe might therefore be paid if some contribute 
more than $5, some contribute less 1:han $5, and some contribute 
nothing. But, each individual in the group will realize both that his 
failure to contribute his share of the bribe will have little effect on 
whether the bribe is paid and that he will benefit the same amount 
2. See, e.g., J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 255-56 (2d ed. 
1971). 
3. Id. at 262-64. 
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regardless of whether and how much he pays. Many individuals will 
therefore attempt to become "free riders" by not contributing. It 
is likely that enough people will attempt to become free riders •that 
the bribe will not be paid. A second reason why the bribe is un-
likely to be paid is that significant costs would be incurred in organ-
izing the group and attempting to compel each group member to 
contribute his share. This "transaction-costs" problem will have par-
ticular impact when the group is large or the amount sought from 
each contributor is small. 
Thus, markets in goods that generate externalities are inefficient. 
Because the hypothetical pareto-optimal bribes that would result in 
the reduction or cessation of production will not occur, goods that 
generate external costs will be overproduced. By similar reasoning, 
goods that generate external benefits will be underproduced, since 
those who receive the external benefits are unlikely to bribe the pro-
ducer to increase production:4 If A's neighbors could bribe him 
commensurate with their benefits, he would cut his lawn once a 
week; since they do not, he cuts it only once a month. 
The obvious alternative to relying upon the market to achieve 
pareto optimality is governmental regulation. The government can 
compel payment by those who are benefited by an increase or de-
crease in the production of a good and can thus avoid the free-rider 
problem. Ideally, by taking into account the external benefits and 
costs generated by production, the government can make pareto-op-
timal decisions concerning the amount of a good that should be pro-
duced. But pareto-optimal decisions can be made only if people can 
signal their preferences to the government and the government can 
aggregate them and make unbiased production decisions. In a sys-
:tem of representative democracy, there are several reasons why this 
cannot occur with any substantial degree of accuracy. First, voters 
do not vote on individual issues, but rather express their preferences 
for candidates running on platforms of varying degrees of specificity. 
Votes are therefore, at best, signals as to a preferred package of 
issues and goods. 5 With decisions based upon such vague voting 
information, government-managed production may even satisfy indi-
vidual preferences less accurately than an unregulated market. Sec-
ond, as Professor Arrow has shown, the decision reached by a ma-
jority may arbitrarily depend on the order of voting on the alternative 
choices. 6 Strategic voting may therefore occur that results in deci-
4. See R. MusGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
74-77 (1973). 
5. See id. at 92-96. 
6. Suppose we have three voters who are voting to choose one of three policies. If 
their preferences follow certain patterns, and if voting is done in sequential pairs with 
majority rule deciding, then the order of voting may determine which policy wins. 
Suppose voter X prefers policy A over policy B over policy C, voter Y prefers C to 
A to B, and voter Z prefers B to C to A. If a vote is taken on A versus B, A wins 
January 1976] The Allocation of Prosecution 589 
sions that do not reflect voter preferences.7 Finally, since it is im-
possible to tax individuals according 1:o the level of benefits they re-
ceive from governmental spending, the provision of goods by the 
government will inevitably result in the redistribution of wealth. 8 
There are more imperfections resulting from government-man-
aged production, but the above examples make the gist of the argu-
ment clear: Market imperfection does not necessarily argue for gov-
ernmental provision because the governments have their own 
drawbacks. A decision whether an economic good should be provided 
by government, therefore, should be based on a weighing of the rela-
tive imperfections of the two sectors. Yet this weighing is not with-
out difficulty. Questions like "How much are voter preferences dis-
torted by representative democracy?" or "How much misallocation 
is there by the private sector?" cannot be answered quantitatively. 
Consequently, no clear-cut answer can be given when one asks 
whether the production level of any specific good should be estab-
lished by the government. 
When a question arises concerning the production of goods that 
are largely private but generate some external benefits and costs, it 
is often suggested that the appropriate policy is for the goods to be 
produced in the market, but for the government to subsidize the pro-
ducer to the extent of the external benefits and tax the producer to 
the extent of the external costs. If this were done, our polluting 
factory owner would be taxed $1000; he would then shut down the 
plant, and the efficient solution would be achieved. 9 But this ap-
proach suffers from the same kinds of problems that render total 
government production infeasible. Both approaches are viable only 
if individuals can provide signals as to the external costs and benefits 
felt by them and only if the government can aggregate and imple-
ment these signals in an unbiased manner. Thus, this approach pro-
vides no automatic solution to the dilemma. 
Where does this leave us? The failures of economic theory do 
not make legislators and administrators stop in their tra~ks. Life 
and then C prevails over A, so C is the policy chosen. But if we start with B versus 
C, B wins, and then A wins over B, so A is the winner. Something as trivial and 
arbitrary as voting order has determined the policy chosen. See generally K. ARR.ow, 
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3 (1951). 
7. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 4, at 92. 
8. This last problem results from the nature of taxation rather than from any 
defects in representative democracy. Suppose there are three taxpayers who benefit 
from government spending by $3, $4 and $5 respectively. As long as each individu-
al's tax burden does not match his benefits from governmental spending, income will 
be redistributed. If taxes are greater than benefits, one loses; if less, one wins. Such 
redistribution is an analytical problem rather than a practical one. While some 
particular redistributions may be desired, characterizations of one situation as better 
than another in the pareto-optimal sense is impossible if wealth is distributed 
differently in-the two situations. See id. at 83-108. 
9. See generally id. at 75-76. 
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(and government) goes on, educated guesses are made, and theory 
is used to fill in the gaps in empirical knowledge. 
This Note attempts some filling in. Two models are developed 
in an effort to compare different goods-the prosecution of different 
offenses-according to their suitability for governmental provision 
and for governmental subsidies to aid private provision. The prose-
cution of an offense can profitably be viewed as an economic good 
because, whether or not successful, it generates benefits and costs 
for the prosecutor, the offender, and third parties. These models 
will isolate factors that influence an offense's suitability for govern-
mental prosecution. While absolute prescriptions as to the mode of 
prosecution for any particular offense are not and cannot be made, 
the use of models allows for the ranking of offenses according to 
their relative suitability for governmental or private prosecution. 
Before constructing the models, two objections to the use of eco-
nomic theory for this purpose must be considered. One objection 
is that this use of economic theory assumes that offenders are "eco-
nomic men." Economic theory studies individuals who are by hy-
pothesis rational maximizers of their welfare, individuals who weigh 
costs and benefits before acting. For the models developed below 
to yield fruitful results, however, it is not necessary that offenders 
be completely rational maximizers. Indeed, the extent to which of-
fenders match or diverge from the "economic man" notion is a key 
variable in one of the models. The models do assume, however, 
that even criminals weigh costs and benefits to some degree before 
acting and are thus deterred by the prospects of punishment or pen-
alty. If this is not true, economic analysis is of no use. 
Whether criminal penalties have a deterrent effect has in the 
past been a matter of some controversy,10 but recent literature offers 
a clear conclusion. The work of Andenaes is anecdotal and its aims 
limited, but it argues convincingly that at least some deterrence ex-
ists.11 His stories of wild outbreaks of criminal behavior during po-
lice strikes,12 for instance, make the deterrence hypothesis hard to 
refute. The works of Ehrlich and Philips use sophisticated econo-
metric techniques to measure deterrence effects and find some pres-
ent.13 Ehrlich, using cross-sectional data from different states, 
10. Some writers have argued that a large number of criminals are neurotic and 
that punishment of offenders therefore bas little deterrent effect. See, e.g., F. 
ALExANDER & H. STA~, THE CRIMINAL, TIIE JUDGE AND TIIE PUBLIC 207-09 (1931), 
Eysenck says that "it is doubtful whether punishment acts as a very effective 
deterrent." H. EYSENCK, CRIME & PERSONALITY 157 (1964). Zimring and Hawkins 
believe in the existence of deterrence, but not for all persons in all situations. They 
conclude, for instance, that "anti-authoritarian" personalities may view a new threat 
as an invitation to defiance. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 123-25 (2d ed. 
1973). 
11. See J. ANDENAES, PuNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974). 
12. Id. at 17, 50-51. 
13. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL 
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found significant correlation between the probability and severity of 
punishment on the one hand and the rate of FBI index crimes on 
the other.14 Given such evidence, one can safely presume that crim-
inals are at least minimally deterred by punishment and thus are at 
least minimally rational. 
The second objection to this use of economic theory is that prose-
cution of offenders can be viewed as a market activity only if there 
is a possibility of private gain when prosecution is performed by pri-
vate individuals. To meet this objection, it is assumed that the vic-
tim who brings an action to punish and deter can, in the same action, 
recover damages for the offense. In order to facilitate the compari-
son of private and governmental prosecution, it is also assumed that, 
if a governmental action is brought, the government will recover and 
remit to the victim money damages for injuries suffered by the vic-
tim. Finally, it is assumed that, in either case, the court adjudicat-
ing the action can impose a fine or prison term on the offender if 
appropriate.15 
II. A MODEL FOR OFFENSES CHARACTERIZED 
BY THE EVIDENTIARY PROBLEM 
The two models presented in this and the next section assess the 
suitability of offenses for governmental prosecution. The first is 
simple, unsurprising, and justifies, on economic grounds, govern-
mental prosecution of the core offenses of the criminal law. The 
second model, more complex, analyzes the remaining criminal and 
tort offenses and suggests a few changes in policy. The easy job 
is undertaken first. 
Certain offenses are characterized by what may be called the evi-
dentiary problem; that is, the offender's identity is often difficult to 
discover unless the offender is apprehended at the scene of the of-
fense, and the details of the crime's commission cannot be deter-
mined through the use of ordinary civil discovery and investigative 
techniques. Some activities that are prosecuted by the government 
as crimes-homicide and larceny, for example-involve the eviden-
tiary problem. Some crimes, such as perjury, do not. Most offenses 
STtJD. 259 (1972); Phillips, Crime Control: The Case for Deterrence, in S. 
RoTIENBURG, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 65-84 ( 1973). 
14. Ehrlich, supra note 13. 
15. These assumptions are necessary to isolate the variables that are of concern in 
this Note. An offense for which imprisonment is_a particularly appropriate punish-
ment is better suited for governmental rather than private prosecution. See text 
following note 20 infra; note 26 infra. On the effect of fines, see notes 22, 26 infra. 
The compensation of victims by the government is assumed in order to facilitate 
comparisons and because such compensation seems an appropriate and feasible goal 
of government. Accordingly, to distinguish governmental and private prosecution on 
the ground that victims are only compensated in the latter situation is improper: The 
analysis used in this Note should not be affected by what is probably a historical 
accident. 
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that are solely torts and that currently are prosecuted privately, such 
as products liability, defamation, misrepresentation, landowners' 
negligence, and most auto accidents, also do not. As demonstrated 
below, the presence of the evidentiary problem justifies public provi-
sion of police16 and consequently makes governmental prosecution 
suitable for offenses characterized by the problem. 
The significance of an offense characterized by the evidentiary 
problem (EP offense) is that investigators who are capable of using 
force are often needed immediately after such an offense has been 
committed in order both to effect the immediate apprehension nec-
essary to make prosecution possible and to investigate the details of 
the offense. The functions of these investigators, or police, are such 
that private agents could not perform them without generating sub-
stantial external benefits and other sources of market imperfections. 
Suppose that a private company, called upon to prevent BP of-
fenses, provides "police services" for a fee to 250 houses out of a 
500-house neighborhood. To be able to arrive quickly at the scene 
of a ·crime, the private policemen need to circle the area in patrol 
cars. In so doing, they benefit the 250 nonsubscribers. The crimi-
nal, seeing a patrol car, does not know which houses belong to sub-
scribers and which do not and is therefore deterred from committing 
crimes against nonsubscribers. Also, the private policemen at times 
apprehend criminals who have robbed homes of nonsubscribers, 
both out of public-spiritedness and on the theory that the criminal's 
apprehension helps subscribers since the criminal might strike in the 
neighborhood again. This practice also deters the commission of of-
fenses at nonsubscribing houses. 
It is thus clear that the private provision of police services to pre-
vent BP offenses in a geographic area generates external benefits 
for those in the area who choose not to help support the police. Be-
cause these benefits would not be reflected in the market price of 
police services, the "production" of police services would be less 
than optimal. This market imperfection means that a better case 
can be made for governmental prosecution of offenses characterized 
by the evidentiary problem than for governmental prosecution of 
other offenses. 
In several respects, the nature of the costs of police services pro-
vides additional support for governmental provision. Private police 
must be able to distinguish between calls for aid from subscribers 
and nonsubscribers. This must be done quickly if the police are to 
operate effectively. This could be done by the installation, in sub-
16. To be more accurate, a better case can be made for public police to deal with 
offenses characterized by the evidentiary problem than can be made for public police 
to deal with other offenses. As noted in the text at notes 5-8 supra, the inability to 
quantify governmental misallocation renders it impossible to make any absolute 
statements concerning the feasibility of governmental provision of police. 
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scribers' homes, of communication devices connected to the private 
police office, but such devices are costly. Similar methods of distin-
guishing subscribers from nonsubscribers would also be costly.17 In 
short, private police companies, investigating EP offenses, face costs 
of excluding nonsubscribers from using their services, costs that 
would not be incurred by public police forces.18 Moreover, the po-
lice protection industry is a "natural monopoly'' for a given geo-
graphic region because it faces decreasing or even zero marginal 
costs for servicing additional customers within the region. A patrol 
car circling a neighborhood and servicing some of the homes within 
the neighborhood could service other homes at virtually no addi-
tional cost. If two police firms each have a squad car patrolling the 
area, inefficiencies result. A more efficient system is for one firm 
to service the area so that it can direct one squad car to service the 
entire area, or, if necessary, two cars to service half the area (or 
half of a slightly larger area) each. The existence of these eco-
nomies of scale makes monopoly "natural'' for a particular area. 
Yet, if a firm establishes a monopoly, it may well exploit its position 
to achieve exorbitant profits. It is for this reason that natural mo-
nopolies, like the police protection industry, traditionally are and 
should be government-run or government-regulated.19 
Two other factors militate in favor of public police. One factor 
is that many of the offenses that present the evidentiary problem 
often require the use of force for apprehension. For noneconomic 
reasons, it might be desirable to restrict the use of force as much 
as possible to agents of the state. The other factor is that investiga-
tors might gain the cooperation of witnesses more readily if they are 
public rather than private investigators. 
In sum, there are economic and noneconomic reasons why gov-
ernment should provide police protection services and, consequently, 
why offenses characterized by the evidentiary problem should be in-
vestigated by government agents. Theoretically, public police could 
investigate such offenses and, upon apprehending the offender and 
learning the details of the offense, turn over the information gath-
ered to the victim. The victim could retain a lawyer to prosecute 
the offense and perhaps to investigate the offense further and inter-
rogate the police about their actions. 
But there are problems with separating the investigative and 
prosecutorial tasks associated with a particular offense. Some prob-
17. Subscribing houses could be identified with stickers, but counterfeiting might 
be a problem and the use of stickers might be viewed as irresponsible-as an incite-
ment to crime against nonsubscribers. The cost of producing, distributing, and apply-
ing stickers would still be a "cost of exclusion." 
18. See generally R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 4, at 53. 
19. See generally w. SHEPERD, PuBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 342-48 
(1975). 
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!ems are purely practical. For example, juggling the schedules of 
police officers so that they can testify at ·trials is more easily accom-
plished by a public prosecutor in daily contact with police officials. 
Similarly, some central office is needed to select the offenses on 
which the police should expend their limited investigative time since 
individual victims, to whom the police services would presumably be 
costless, would direct the police to engage in a major investigation 
each time. Moreover, coordination problems would arise if the po-
lice were required to take orders from different individuals each day. 
One problem with separating the investigative and prosecutorial 
tasks is considerably more fundamental than these practical consider-
ations. Since government activities are not run on -the profit motive, 
noneconomic incentives are necessary to maintain the morale of gov-
ernment personnel. In particular, police presumably must feel that 
their work will result in the attainment of justice. 20 If the prosecu-
tion function is left to private individuals, police might believe that 
they are working only to enrich private lawyers and that the discre-
tionary decision to prosecute criminals will be made on grounds un-
related to justice. The fact that police must feel that they are serving 
a public function, rather than merely aiding market activities, is a 
persuasive reason for governmental prosecution of offenses that 
pose the evidentiary problem. 
The conclusion of this first economic model is that BP offenses, 
which are by and large the "core" offenses of the criminal law, are 
the best cases for governmental prosecution. This conclusion is sup-
ported by a few practical considerations. Of all offenders, those 
who commit core offenses are perhaps most likely to be indigent. 
Many victims will be unwilling to prosecute indigent offenders unless 
subsidized by the government for the costs of prosecution because 
any damage judgment in their favor would be uncollectible. But, 
in subsidizing victims, the government in effect must decide which 
offenders should be prosecuted and must pay for the prosecution. 
It might well be more economical for the government to prosecute 
offenders directly rather than to do so indirectly by subsidizing vic-
tims. Moreover, society may determine that, of all offenders, those 
who commit BP offenses are most in need of receiving prison terms 
rather than some other form of punishment. Because offenders who 
are imprisoned are likely to be unable to satisfy damage judgments 
entered against them, governmental subsidy of private prosecution 
and, hence, governmental prosecution itself, may be required for of-
fenses committed by offenders who are apt to be imprisoned. 
ill. A MODEL FOR OTHER CRIMES AND TORTS 
The model set forth above explains in a general manner why 
20. See generally McDowell, Police as Victims of Their Own Misconceptions, 62 
J. CRIM. L. 430,432 (1971). 
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offenses characterized by the evidentiary problem are the most appro-
priate offenses for public rather than private prosecution. The· sec-
ond model deals with the remaining crimes and torts in a more com-
plex manner. The model has two parts. The first examines the 
. determinants of the ratio of private to external benefits from private 
prosecution in order to assess the degree to which the free market 
errs in allocating resources ,to the prosecution of various offenses. 
The first part shows that market error is greatest for offenses the 
prosecution of which gives rise to the greatest net external benefits 
relative to net private benefits. It also shows that net external ben-
efits are greatest for offenses that are deterred the most by the pros-
ecution of offenders. The second part assesses the degree to which 
the government errs in allocating resources to ·the prosecution of var-
ious offenses. It demonstrates that the moral stigma associated with 
the offense and the political influence of the offender relative to the 
political influence of the victim affect governmental error. These 
findings are then employed to determine the relative appropriateness 
of governmental prosecution for certain offenses. 
At the outset, it must be established that the amount of market 
error in providing a good varies with the relative weight of the ex-
ternal benefits to the private benefits generated by the good. This 
proposition can be demonstrated by the following table (all benefit 




















The numbers in columns Ba ,through Bt2 represent quantitatively the 
benefits generated per unit of some good at quantities 2, 4, and 6 
of that good. In particular, the numbers in column Ba represent the 
benefits per unit of the good received by party A, the consumer of 
the good; the numbers in column Be1 are the external benefits per 
unit resulting from the production of the good according to one 
measure of external benefits; the numbers in column Be2 are the ex-
ternal benefits per unit resulting from the production of ,the good 
according to a second i:p.easure of external benefits. The last two 
columns are benefit totals. Bu is derived by adding the quantities 
in Bn and Bel, Bt2 is the sum of Bn and Be2, 
Where the per unit external benefits generated by the produc-
tion of the good equal the quantities set forth in column Be1, con-
sumer A, in an optimal setting, will be willing to pay for the good 
at the Bu schedule, since those receiving the external benefits will 
bribe him to do so. But, as noted above, 21 the existence of the free-
21. See text at notes 3-4 supra. 
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rider and transaction-costs problems will lead him to be willing to pay 
only at the Ba schedule. Thus, consumer A will be willing to pay 
only 12 per unit for a quantity of 2 units when in an optimal situation 
he would be willing to pay 15. 
Suppose the market price of the good equals 12. Because A 
is willing to buy 2 units at the price of 12 per unit, he will demand 
2 units of the good. If the external benefits equaled the Bet sched-
ule and an optimal situation existed, however, consumer A would 
have demanded 4 units at a market price of 12 per unit. Because 
of market imperfections, therefore, only half the optimal amount is 
produced. Alternatively, if external benefits equal the Be2 schedule, 
actual demand will still be determined by the Ba schedule, but opti-
mal demand will be determined by the Bt2 schedule. Optimally, A 
will demand 6 units at a market price of 12 per unit whereas actually 
he will demand only 2 units. Thus, at external benefits equal to 
Be2 and a market price of 12, only one third of the optimal amount 
is produced. 
The results for a market price of 12 are summarized in the fol-
lowing table: 
Ba/Be1 = 12/3 
Ba/Be2 = 12/6 
Optimal Production/ Actual Production 
4/2 
6/2 
This table illustrates what should be intuitively obvious. As the ex-
ternal benefits rise relative to the private benefits (from 12/3 to 
12/ 6), the actual production of -the good deviates more from the op-
timal production (from 4/2 to 6/2), and thus the market error in 
failing to allocate resources to the production of the good increases. 
Alternatively, and more significantly, it can be said that, for two 
goods that render the same amount of benefits per unit to consumer 
A at a given quantity (that is, they have the same Ba schedule), 
there will be less underproduction of the good that generates exter-
nal benefits at the Bet schedule than of ,the good that generates ex-
ternal benefits at the Be2 schedule. Thus, the relative efficiency of 
the market in producing various goods can be determined by com-
paring the ratio of private benefits to external benefits (Bp/Bo) of 
the goods. The higher the BP/Be ratio, :the more accurately the 
market allocates resources to the production of the good. 22 
22. A more general formulation is easy to develop. Let f 1 be private demand 
and /2 external benefits. Let both of them be functions of price, with the resulting 
values being quantities. Thus fi (pO) = qo, f 2 (pO) = q1• The optimal equilibrium 
quantity will be f 1 (pO) + f 2 (pO) = qO + q 1 = q2; but the actual quantity will 
be only qo. Thus, actual/optimal= qO/q2 = /1(pO)/[f1(pO) + f2 (pO)]. Now, we 
can define a function g such that / 1 = g(/2 ). Then, actual/optimal = g (f2)/(c(f2 ) + /2 ). Plainly, as g gets larger, the fraction gets nearer to 1. Thus, as / 1 gets 
larger relative to f 21 the actual quantity bought gets nearer to the optimal quanity. 
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The remainder of this section attempts to describe the deter-
minants of the Bp/Be ratio for specific goods-the prosecution of 
various offenses-and thus attempts to determine the relative mar-
ket efficiency in allocating resources to the prosecution of the of-
fenses. It hypothesizes that all offenses, both torts and crimes, are 
prosecuted in the market-that is, by the victim of the offense. The 
method of analysis employed entails several assumptions. 23 First, 
it assumes that the victim can recover actual but not punitive dam-
ages in all prosecution actions. Second, it assumes that successful 
prosecutions generate net external benefits for the victim and so-
ciety, which is true so long as the behavior-controlling laws are just 
and prosecutions are successful only when the defendant has in fact 
committed the offense alleged. 24 Finally, it assumes that society has 
benefited $X when an offender has compensated his victim $X, 
which requires that an offender's enjoyment of his ill-gotten gains 
be viewed as having no societal value. 25 The analysis views victim-
23. These assumptions may be oversimplifications, but they are necessary to keep 
the discussion within reasonable bounds. In large measure, they should be "correct"; 
that is, the empirical ones describe existing facts correctly and the ethical ones ex-
press attitudes that are widely held. 
24. Complications ensue when one drops the assumption that every successful 
prosecution is factually proper. The result is that a private action might be either 
beneficial or costly to society with respect to both private and external factors. The 
damages won are a social benefit if plaintiff is right and a cost if he is wrong. The 
external effects are more complicated. External benefits in the form of deterring 
offenders will occur whether or not plaintiff was right because, first, potential 
offenders will not know whether plaintiff was right and, second, even if plaintiff was 
wrong, a judgment for plaintiff still suggests that successful prosecution of a given 
offender is more likely than before. External costs are generated in so far as 
frivolous, yet potentially _victorious, suits are encouraged by a plaintiff's improper 
success. 
25. There are several ways to vary this assumption. One can assume that, while 
losses to victims are social costs, gains to offenders can in part be social benefits. If 
so, a "transfer offense" like theft will present social costs in the amount of the 
victim!s loss minus f times the offender's gain, where f is a fraction between O and 1. 
This will result in generally lower social costs from transfer offenses and will entail a 
policy of less spending to combat these offenses than will be the case under the 
assumption used in the text. . 
Alternatively-one can assume the same kind of cost-offset as above but hypothe-
size that there is another element of social cost: whenever an offense is committed 
there are "injustice costs" to society. If "injustice costs" are constant over all 
offenses, this assumption will entail no changes in policy, but, if they vary, then there 
will be more spending on the more unjust offenses. 
Another approach is the more thoroughgoing utilitarian one of assuming that 
transfers are good to the extent that total utility is increased. If one accepts the 
plausible thesis that the marginal utility of money diminishes with wealth, then thefts 
from the rich by the poor may provide net social benefits (although total utility can 
also include increasing people's feelings of safety). This approach thus entails 
separating transfer offenses by the wealth of the average offender and the average 
victim. Prosecution is most desirable where the offender is wealthier than the victim 
and perhaps unjustified if the offender is poorer than the victim. Using this approach, 
deterrence may result in external costs as well as benefits, since a prosecution may 
deter poor offenders from acting against rich victims. In short, alterations in the 
assumption made in the text can significantly alter the conclusion of the analysis. 
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compensation and deterrence as the goals of a prosecution. While 
the analysis does not consider the goal of retribution, the model de-
veloped can apply without alteration to a legal system that places 
significant emphasis on that goal.26 
The BP/Be ratio is the ratio of net private to net external bene-
fits that would result if, for the average offense, the victim brought 
or tried to bring an action against the offender. "Bringing an ac-
tion" includes everything from initial settlement discussion to actual 
trial of the prosecution. "Net private benefits" (Bp) to an average 
individual from bringing an action is a function of the probability of 
success, the various gross benefit determinants, and the various cost 
determinants. This quantity can be represented as follows: 
B(Pei, D, CL, Xi ••• Xn, ••• Yi • • • Yn) 
Psi, with i varying from 1 through n, is the schedule of probabilities 
of success27 at various levels, levels I through n, of "bringing the ac-
tion." It is clear that the chances of success will vary with the level 
to wltj.ch the action is pursued, and thus with the amount of resources 
committed to the action by the victim. Presumably, the victim will 
26. The method of analysis used here need not be altered significantly if one 
concludes, as many have, see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 
231 (1968), that retribution requires the punishment of those who commit immoral 
offenses. Because immoral offenses are generally crimes and morally neutral offenses 
are generally torts, adherence to such a view appears at first blush to support the 
present crime/tort distinction that separates governmental and private prosecution. 
The implications of the retributive theory, however, are not so simple, but rather must 
be uncovered by asking what the retributive theory demands. Hart argues that one 
key ramification of the retributive theory is that the severity of the punishment must 
vary with the gravity of the offense. Id. This ramification does not necessarily alter 
the analysis employed in the text since the court adjudicating a prosecution can 
increase the severity of the punishment by imposing a fine, whether or not prosecu-
tion is by the government. If uniform fines are viewed as unfair in the sense that 
they burden the poor convicted offender more than the rich one, fines could be 
tailored according to the income and wealth of the offender in the manner of a 
progressive income tax. The imposition of fines in this manner would require a 
change in the model developed in this Note, since B.IB. would be larger for offenses 
with relatively wealthier offenders. Presumably such a change would be required 
only where offenders are individuals rather than corporations. It is of course not at 
all clear that uniform fines for a particular offense are unfair, since each offender, 
regardless of income, profits the same from committing an offense. 
If imprisonment is considered_necessary to satisfy the goal of retribution, govern-
mental action of some sort probably will be necessary to increase private prosecution 
to the optimal level. This is true since private plaintiffs may be reluctant to 
prosecute an offender who will be imprisoned and wilI be therefore unlikely to satisfy 
a damage judgment entered against him. No alteration in the model developed in the 
text is necessary if imprisonment is deemed appropriate only for violations of offenses 
characterized by the evidentiary problem. See text following note 16 supra. 
In discussing retribution, Hart also mentions the "reprobative theory," id. at 235, 
the theory that retribution by the state performs an act of authoritative moral 
condemnation and that this state condemnation is important, either morally or as a 
means of deterrence. This theory does not necessarily require alteration of the model 
since the state condemns all offenses through the rulings of judges and through state 
enforcement and execution of the rulings. 
27. "Success" is used to mean the recovery of full damages. 
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actually commit to the action that amount of resources that optimizes 
his return. 28 D is the amount of damages inflicted on the victim. CL 
represents the schedule of litigation costs and talces into account the 
fact that litigation costs will vary with the level to which an action 
is pursued. Finally, "x1 . . . Xn" are other determinants of gross 
·benefits and "y1 . . . Yn" are other determinants of costs. These 
dummy variables could be replaced by more specific ones, but will 
not be so replaced because greater detail in the theory will not yield 
any fruitful implications. 
The "net external benefits" (Be) resulting from an action are 
derived by analyzing the deterrent effect of the action. The prose-
cution of an offender imposes some costs on the offender, whether 
or not the prosecution is successful, and should thus change his esti-
mate of the probable costs and benefits from the commission of fu-
ture offenses. 29 The offender will view future offenses as at least 
slightly less profitable than if no action had been brought simply be-
cause his estimates of the likelihood that future actions will be 
brought will depend on his past experiences. Similarly, other poten-
tial offenders will be affected to some small degree by the action 
since some of them will be aware of the action and will consider it 
in weighing the possible costs associated with the commission of fu-
ture offenses. Put very simply, offenders will be deterred by the 
action. They will commit fewer offenses and thus will inflict less 
damage on third parties. This avoided damage can be viewed as 
the external benefits resulting from the prosecution. 30 
The quantification of these external benefits can profitably be~ 
gin with an analysis of the net damage caused by an average offense. 
Net damage is, in general, the actual damage inflicted upon the aver-
age victim less the amount of the average victim's actual damage re-
covery. The average victim's damage recovery in turn depends 
upon the probability that the victim will bring an action and the aver-
age damage recovery when an action is brought. Net damage can 
therefore be quantified as follows: 
D-PJ [B' (P's!, D, CL, Xi • • • Xn, Yi • • • Yn)] 
D is the actual damage inflicted upon the average victim. PJ is the 
probability that the victim will bring an action. The B' function, 
which is similar to but differs in significant ways from the B function, 
28. That is, the amount of resources expended is the amount that minimizes a loss 
function for the plaintiff, which function depends on the amount of damages in the 
case, the plaintifrs chances of recovering, and the costs of recovering. 
29. Offenders may be able to insure themselves against liability. Such a practice 
would change somewhat the costs incurred by offenders who lose suits, but not the 
general pattern of those costs. If an offender commits an offense in period t and is 
prosecuted, his insurance premiums in period t + 1 will cost him more. 
30. Landes and Posner appear to realize that there can be externalities from 
deterrence, but do not take the point any further. See Landes & Posner, The Private 
Enforcement of Law, 4J. LEGALSTµD.29 (1975). 
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is the average expected benefits that result in actions that are actu-
ally brought. B' is a function of P's1, the probability of success in 
actions that are actually brought, and of D, the victims' damages, Ct, 
:the litigation costs, "x1 . . . Xn," the various benefit determinants, 
-and "y1 . . . Yn," the cost determinants. B' differs from B in that 
B is the average benefits that would result if an action were brought 
for every offense. To phrase it differently, B is the benefits that 
the average victim can expect to recover, with the averaging process 
including not only instances where an action has some likelihood of 
success, but also instances where the action is likely to result in a 
net cost to the victim. PiB' (. . . ) is the average net recovery by 
the victim for each offense and is obtained in effect by multiplying 
the average recovery in cases actually brought by the likelihood that 
an action will be brought. PJB' (. . . ) will be greater than or equal 
to B, assuming that victims bring actions when it is profitable to do 
so, because the averaging undertaken to determine PJB' ( ... ) ex-
cludes actions that would be unprofitable to the victim. 31 
The next step in quantifying the external benefits is to analyze 
the deterrent .effect of an action, that is, the diminution, caused by 
the prosecution, in the probability that offenders will commit of-
fenses. 32 An action deters both the offender against whom the ac-
tion is brought (special deterrence) and other potential offenders 
(general deterrence). The amount of deterrence turns on whether 
the aotion is successful, although, because the defendant must ex-
pend resources to defend any action, some deterrence occurs even 
if the action is unsuccessful. Special deterrence can be quantitified 
as follows: 
Per Pdl1 + (l-Pe1) Pd31 
As above, Psi, for i equals 1 through n, is ,the probability of success 
schedule for actions brought for every case. Pdu is the change in 
the likelihood that •the defendant will discontinue offending that re-
sults from a successful action brought against him. Because of the 
31. The following example elucidates the distinction between B and PJB' (, • ,), 
Assume that 10 offenses occur. If actions are brought to redress 2 of the offenses 
and $10 are recovered in each, P1 is 2/10, B' is $10, and PJB'(, •. ) is $2. Assume 
that, if the eight remaining offenses had been prosecuted, $5 would have been 
recovered in one, $5 would have been lost in each of five, and $10 would have been 
lost in each of two. B therefore is the total benefits and costs from the prosecutions, 
$(20), divided by the number of <?ffenses, 10, for a result of $(2), 
32. A subtle distinction must be made to understand the deterrence factor. The 
P.i variable measures not the absolute deterrability of an offender, but rather the 
offender's response to increases in costs of offending; it measures incremental rather 
than total deterrence. On the basis of his life experiences, A may be more deterred 
by the general specter of law enfor<;ement than B, but B may be more affected by a 
change in the amount of law enforcement. B possesses a higher value for Pd, Put 
another way, if Y equals aX plus b, where Y is the amount of deterrence and X the 
amount of law enforcement, here we are interested in a, the slope of the line, not in b, 
the intercept. 
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variance of the costs of litigation and of the probable damage re-
covery, Pdu varies (from i equals 1 through n) with the level to 
which the action is pursued by the victim before it is successful. 
(l-Pa1) is, of course, the probability that the action will be unsuccess-
ful, and P da1 is the change in the likelihood that the defendant will 
discontinue offending that results from an unsuccessful action, with 
both figures varying from i equals 1 through n according to the level 
to which the action is pursued before the victim concludes that it 
is unsuccessful. In short, special deterrence is the sum of the deter-
rent effect of a successful action times the probability that the action 
will be successful and the deterrent effect of an unsuccessful action 
times the probability that the action will be unsuccessful. 
The amount of general deterrence can be derived similarly. Each 
potential offender is deterred as follows: 
P.st Pc121 + (l-Pa1) Pd41 
This quantification is the same as the quantification of special deter-
rence except that P d21 and P d4t refer to the deterrence of offenders 
other than the defendant that results from successful and unsuccess-
ful prosecutions respectively. Total general deterrence is therefore 
K [P"'1 Pc121 + (l-Pa1) Pd41] 
where K is the total number .of potential offenders. The sum of the 
specific and general deterrence is the total deterrent effect of the 
action: 
[Psi Pdu + (1-Pa1) Pdai] + K [Pel Pc121 + (1-Pe1) Pd4i] 
This can be simplified algebraically to: 
P.1 (Pdu + KPd21) + (l-P.1) (Pda1 + KPd4t) 
It is at this point possible to quantify the net external benefits 
flowing from an action. The only additional factor that must be 
added is N, the number of future offenses that the average potential 
offender was likely to commit before the action at issue was brought. 
Total net external benefits (Be) are therefore: 
[P.1 (Pdu + KPd21) + (l-Ps1) (Pdst + KPd4t)] 
N[D-PJ B' (P's1, D, CL, X1 ... Xn, Y1 ... Yn)] 
These quantitative formulations of BP and Be can be employed 
to determine what factors influence the BP/Be ratio, and thus market 
efficiency. All the "P" variables-Psi, P's1, PJ, and the Pis-are be-
tween O and 1 since they represent probabilities and changes in prob-
abilities. The quantity D- pj B' (P's1, D, CL, Xt • • • Xn, Yi • .. Yn) is 
positive since the average net recovery in instances where an action 
is brought, discounted by the lik-elihood that an action will be brought, 
is clearly less than the average amount of damages inflicted upon 
the victim ( assuming no punitive damage recovery). 
At this point, several factors can be isolated that make the Be 
for one offense greater than the Be for another, and thus make possi-
ble a comparison of relative market efficiency in allocating resources 
for the prosecution of the offenses. The most important factor is 
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deterrence. As the Pis increase, Be increases without any corres-
ponding effect on Bp. Thus, with all other factors equal, the mar-
ket is least efficient for those offenses deterred •the most by the pros-
cution of offenders. Two other factors clearly affecting BP/Bo are 
the number of potential offenders and the average number of of-
fenses committed by each offender. If other factors are equal, Bo 
increases as these factors increase, and thus the market becomes less 
efficient. CL, the costs of litigation, is the final factor with a de-
terminate effect on BP/Be. An increase in CL makes B and thus 
BP smaller. It also lowers the value of B', and Be becomes larger. 
The net effect, therefore, is that BP/Be decreases with an increase in 
CL.33 
The effects of differences in Pai are more difficult to determine. 
An increase in Pai has a positive influence on the B function since 
the average net benefits from an action increase with an increase 
in the probability of success. Thus, an increase in Pai increases Bp, 
But an increase in Pai has an indeterminate effect on Be, as can be 
seen from the deterrence formulation as originally devised: 
[Psi Pdll + (1-Pa1) Pdat] + K[Pa1 Pd21 + (1-Pat) Pd4t] 
Because deterrence is greater for successful actions than for unsuc-
cessful actions, Pd11 is greater than Pdat and Pd21 is greater than Pd4I, 
Thus, an increase in Pai would increase the entire deterrence formu-
lation and thus Be, But an increase in Psi, which would be accom-
panied by an increase in P's1, which would tend to decrease Be, Con-
sequently, an increase in Pai has an indeterminate effect on Be and 
thus on the Bp/Be ratio. 
The same indeterminacy is present with respect to the effect of 
D, the average damages inflicted upon the victim. An increase in 
D increases BP by increasing the average damage recovery of the 
victim, but it also increases Be by increasing the net social cost of 
the offenses that have been deterred. The effect on BP/Be, there-
fore, is unclear. 34 
To summarize, there are four factors that have determinate ef-
fects on comparative market efficiency in allocating resources for the 
prosecution of various offenses: the deterrent effect of a prosecu-
tion, the number of potential offenders, the average number of fu-
ture offenses per potential offender, and the schedule of litigation 
costs.35 
33. One other factor that has a clear effect is Pi, the probability that an offense 
will be followed by a prosecution. If Pi for one offense is greater than Pi for a 
second, with other factors equal, the average social cost caused per offense will be 
less for the first (since PiB(P.1, x1 ••• Xn, y1 ••• Yn) will be greater), and thus 
B. will be less. Consequently, as Pi increases without alteration of the other factors, 
market efficiency increases. This is of little significance, however, since a change in 
Pi will always have been stimulated by a change in another variable. 
34. D will have a positive effect on both B and B'. The effect on Bp/B. then 
remains indeterminate. 
35. It is worthwhile to look briefly at the effect of the imposition of punitive 
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Before examining these factors and considering various offenses 
in light of these factors, a theory of government misallocation must 
be developed. 36 As noted above, 37 there are several reasons why 
a representative government cannot efficiently and without bias col-
lect, aggregate, and implement the preferences of voters regarding 
individual allocation decisions. Most sources . of government error 
in the allocation of resources for the prosecution of offenses do not 
vary with the different types of offenses. But one significant source 
of error-the influence of offenders on the legislative and adminis-
trative decision-making processes--does vary among offenses. Per-
sons who frequently commit a particular offense are apt to exert in-
fluence to limit the frequency of prosecution of those who commit 
the offense. Government, as a consequence, may under-allocate re-
sources for the prosecution of these offenses. 38 
This source of government error varies among offenses in two 
ways. First, some offenses possess a moral stigma such that lobby-
ing against their prosecution is effectively prohibited. For example, 
it is difficult to imagine embezzlers lobbying for lessened prosecu-
tion. It is much less difficult to imagine the National Manufacturers' 
Association working, perhaps quasi-surreptitiously, to limit products 
liability prosecutions. The difference between these situations is 
that political influence is deemed. legitimate for some purposes but 
not for others. 
Second, the relative amount of government error varies with the 
relative influence of the individual victims and offenders. If, for a 
given offense, the offender's gain from the offense is substantially 
less than the victim's loss, the former will have less at stake and 
thus presumably will exert less effort toward influencing government 
prosecution patterns. More significantly, as Mancur Olson has 
damages on the model. Let F equal some fine imposed on defendants found liable 
and paid to winning plaintiffs. Then the B./B. equation looks like this for a court 
system that imposes such fines: 
(B ( ••• ) + F)/[P.1 (Pd1t + K Pd21) + (l-P.1) (Pd3l + KPd41)JN[D-PiB' (. • .) -
PiFJ 
The deterrence variables are new ones, since they depend on the level of the fine. 
A positive F will increase private benefits and increase the amount of deterrence, but 
will decrease the benefits from deterrence, N[. . .]. Therefore, external benefits, 
and thus the ratio of private to external benefits, will be affected in an uncertain way 
by the imposition of punitive damages. 
36. The following discussion in the text deals only with governmental prosecution 
of offenses under existing laws. Changing the substantive law is not at issue since it 
is an option under either public or private prosecution. 
37. See text at notes 5-8 supra. 
38. One cannot speak of "good" forces that balance the offenders' influence in 
the political process and lead to efficiency. That is because these "good" forces-
citizens wishing to combat offenses-are merely part of an efficient governmental 
process under the view, _invoked here, of government as a quasi-market body that 
merely transforms proper citizen preferences into policy. Anything influencing 
government other than citizens working for their legitimate preferences will tend to 
result in error relative to this "efficient" process. 
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pointed out in The Logic of Collective Action, 39 large groups seek-
ing collective goods, goods with largely external benefits, will not 
succeed in obtaining the goods as well as smaller groups seeking sim-
ilar goods because the free-rider problem will be more severe for 
the former. Political pressure groups, Olson demonstrates, fit into 
this analysis. Thus, small pressure groups of a given total power will 
work more effectively than large groups of the same total power. 
This analysis explains why producers' lobbies are more politically 
significant than consumers' lobbies, despite the fact that each side 
has the same amount at stake in a particular controversy. Its signi-
ficance in this context is that a small group of frequent offenders 
or victims is more likely to be influential than a larger group of minor 
ones. Thus, relative size of victim and offender is a significant vari-
able here. 
In sum, governmental misallocation of resources for the prosecu-
tion of an offense is influenced by •the moral stigma attaching to the 
offense and the relative size and thus political influence of the of-
fender and the victim. 40 
IV. ALLOCATING THE PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTION , 
The second model developed above is admittedly abstract and 
cannot, absent empirical input, yield concrete conclusions that might 
lead us to change current policy. One way to operationalize such 
a model is to estimate the variables using rigorous quantitative tech-
niques. For instance, regression analysis could be employed to un-
cover the factors that influence deterrence. For lack of sufficient 
empirical data, this Note employs a more casual analysis, filling in 
the variables by a series of informed guesses. These speculations 
suggest some useful policy initiatives and highlight some fruitful 
prospects for further, more sophisticated, investigation. 
Of the determinants isolated above that influence market and 
governmental efficiency in allocating resources for prosecutions, de-
terrence is the one that must first be examined. The likelihood that 
a potential offender will be deterred by a particular prosecution ap-
pears to turn on five factors: first, the amount of resources that the 
potential offender devotes to information-gathering, which affects 
the likelihood that he will learn of the prosecution; second, whether 
he weighs costs and benefits carefully before committing an offense; 
third, his degree of risk aversion; fourth, whether he is a habitual 
offender; and, fifth, the "moral severity" of the offense that he poten-
tially will commit. 41 These factors must be understood in order to 
compare offenses according to their Pd factors. 
39. See M. OLSON, THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 60-66, 125-48 (1965). 
40. See also text at notes 5-8 supra. 
41. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWXINS, supra note 10, at 98-118. 
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The first factor influencing the deterrent effect of a prosecution 
is the amount of resources devoted by the average offender to 
gather information about prosecution trends. This factor is in large 
measure a function of the number of offenses the offender commits 
and the value to him of committing an offense. The more offenses 
that a potential offender is likely to commit and the more he gains 
from each, the greater the likelihood that he will be prosecuted and 
that he will, because of a prosecution, be forced to forgo committing 
future profitable offenses. Consequently, the greater the total value 
to the offender of the offenses he commits, the more money he opti-
mally will spend to avoid the harm from prosecution;42 that is, •the 
more he will spend trying to avoid being prosecuted and, if prose-
cuted, convicted. One aspect of ensuring safety from prosecution 
involves informing oneself about the likelihood of prosecution. An 
offender must understand -the extent of the danger before he can 
act profitably. In short, more is optimally spent in gathering infor-
mation where total offenses are monetarily more significant. 
This factor, in an understandable manner, distinguishes offenses 
on the basis of the average benefit to the offender of committing 
an offense. In a manner less clear and in need of further explica-
tion, the factor distinguishes offenses on the basis of the nuniber of 
offenses committed. The amount of resources committed to infor-
mation-gathering could vary with -the number of offenses of a partic-
ular kind that are committed by a whole "industry," without regard 
to the characteristics of individual offenders. Or, it could vary with 
the number of offenses of a particular kind committed by each in-
dividual offender.43 That the last of these two variations is correct 
is not difficult to demonstrate. Suppose there are ten instances of 
defective products manufactured each year and ten instances of mis-
representation, and that the prospects for harm to offenders from 
prosecution are the same per offense for both industries. Assume 
also that the costs of providing information about the prospects of 
prosecution are the same for both. Assume finally that one offender 
commits all ten "products liability" torts while ten different people 
commit the acts of misrepresentation. 
In which industry is more information gathered? One might ar-
gue that, if the productivity from information-gathering is the same 
for the two industries, each industry will expend the same amount. 
Assuming that each of the two offenses is equally beneficial to the 
42. As characterized by Becker in Crime and Punishment: An Economic Ap-
proach, 76 J. PoL. EcoN. 169 (1968), this is a cost-minimizing situation. One 
minimizes total cost by minimizing the sum of the cost from that activity and the cost 
of preventing the activity. The optimal amount of prevention is that amount at 
which the marginal cost of prevention equals the marginal cost of activity. 
43. Note that, while the resources devoted to information-gathering depend on the 
number of offenses committed per "industry," the information actually gathered, as 
the following discussion in the text points out, may not. 
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offender, the optimal amount spent per offense will be •the same in 
each industry, $X, and thus the manufacturer of defective products 
will spend $10X and each misrepresenter, $X. Optimally, the mis-
representers will not duplicate their efforts. Instead, a firm will 
come into being to provide the information they need, the $1 OX will 
be paid to the firm, and each misrepresenter will receive the firm's 
total product of information for the price of $X. This total product 
will be the same as gathered by the single manufacturer of defective 
products since the revenue to the information-gatherer is the same 
in each case. 44 
This optimal situation, however, is unlikely to occur. The infor-
mation firm can supply the same information to all ten misrepresent-
ers because information is a "social good": A's use of the informa-
tion does not preclude B's use of it. But for this very reason, the 
firm will not be able to maintain its market. When its information 
is sold to misrepresenter A, he may sell it himself to B at a price 
less than $X. And B, in turn, may sell it or even give it to C. This 
problem, similar in effect to the free-rider problem, means that a 
market may not exist that is sufficiently profitable for an informa-
tion-gathering firm to come into existence. Even if such a firm does 
arise, it may not face the same demand for its product, and thus will 
not gather as much information, as does the single manufacturer of 
defective products who does not have these transaction problems. 
The relevant variables isolated by this first factor for determining 
which offenses are most easily deterred, therefore, are the number 
of offenses committed by the average offender, the benefit to the 
offender of committing an offense, and the resources the offender 
has available for information-gathering. Large, frequent offenders 
committing profitable offenses will spend more on information-gath-
ering, learn more, and thus be more deterrable. 
The relationship between the frequency with which an offender 
commits an offense and his deterrability probably is not continuous, 
for threshold effects are likely to exist. If an offender has few re-
sources to devote to information-gathering, he may be limited to ef-
forts such as acquiring information by word of mouth, reading peri-
odicals of mass circulation, and perhaps personal library research, 
measures ,that for many offenses may not be worthwhile. Effective 
measures, notably hiring attorneys to investigate the chances of pros-
ecution thoroughly, require resources beyond the means of many of-
fenders.45 One time, infrequent, and even frequent but small offend-
44. The solution may be more complex depending on the nature of the demand 
curve for information on the part of these firms, but the statement in the text is at 
least roughly true. 
45. The government and "public" agencies, like law reviews, publish information 
relevant to offenders, but it is not organized and analyzed sufficiently to be of use to 
an offender in making his decision. General Motors, for example, still needs lawyers 
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ers, therefore, might for some offenses be lumped together in the 
category of having no worthwhile information available to them. For 
such offenses, large, highly active offenders are likely to be the only 
offenders at all well informed. A small restauranteur, for example, 
probably does nothing to investigate his chances of being sued for 
spoiled food even though hes may be ai fairly frequent offender. 
Changes in the local climate are therefore unlikely to affect him. 
Very active offenders have another advantage that ensures them 
more information than others. Such offenders may supply a large 
enough fraction of the total "market" for a given offense that trends 
in prosecution will become apparent simply from the prosecutions 
that they themselves face. General Motors lawyers, for example, 
know about trends in products liability prosecutions without having 
to research the issue. 
The second factor relevant in determining the relative deterra-
bility of particular offenses is the care employed by offenders in 
weighing the costs and benefits from offending. If offenders for a 
particular offense do not consider the benefits and •the costs of com-
mitting the offense before acting, the prospect of a greater penalty 
will not deter them. The better an offender understands the costs 
and benefits from a given act, the more likely he is to respond to 
a change in those parameters. 
This second factor can be broken down into several separate ele-
ments. One threshold element is that an offender must analyze his 
activities. In Zimring's terms, he must be reflective rather than im-
pulsive. 46 If an offender does not reflect on the impact of his acti-
vities, even past activities, he will never have considered their costs. 
Another element is whether an offender attempts to quantify costs 
and benefits. Quantification need not be precise, but even rough 
quantification is more accurate than mere estimates of costs as being 
"high" or "low." The more detailed an offender is in quantifying 
costs and benefits, the more likely he is to notice and respond to 
cost and benefit changes. A third element is whether an offender 
plans ahead, whether he is "future-oriented" in Zimring's jargon.47 
This second factor singles out most clearly those offenses that 
grow out of an offender's economic activity. Businessmen tend to 
analyze future actions because of their habitual use of accountants 
and accounting procedures and their need ·to justify projects to in-
vestors and lenders. Large organizations are particularly analytical 
because their project decisions, more institutionalized; and imper-
sonal, are based less on individual judgments and more on numbers 
to read the law review articles and government statistics, to talk to people in 
government, and to collate this data to define the problems facing General Motors. 
46. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINs, supra note 10, at 106-08. 
47. Id. at 98-99. 
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and -hard data. Regular forecasts and plans assure that large organ-
izational offenders are future-oriented. A distinction must be 
drawn, however, between a business or businessman who commits 
offenses in the regular course of business and a person who com-
mits business offenses. The former is one whose business activities 
incidentally include the commission of offenses. He may well eval-
uate offending as just another business decision, and, if so, the above 
analysis applies. The latter offender, characterized by one commit-
ting a large scale sales fraud or perpetrating a land fraud scheme, 
is quite different. His decision to offend is probably not made with 
the aid of accounting procedures or institutionalized planning since 
it is an initial decision rather than a decision made in the context 
of a series of business decisions. Such an offender cannot be ex-
pected to engage in a careful evaluation of costs and benefits before 
acting.48 
The third factor in determining Pd for a particular offense is the 
risk preferences of the offenders. Often a pattern of committing of-
fenses is "risky" in that ·there is some possibility of large resulting 
losses. An offender risks having to reimburse the victim for the 
damages he suffers, which may be well in excess of the offender's 
profit from offending, and he also risks having to pay litigation ex-
penses. A series of such losses from several offenses may be catas-
trophic, and the possibility of catastrophic loss will exist even though 
the offender's profit from offending exceeds his expected prosecu-
tion losses. 
Different offenders will view this schedule of possible losses dif-
ferently. Some will be "risk averse" in the sense that they will base 
their decisions not on the expected value of their activities40 but 
rather on the possibility of catastrophic losses. Risk averse offend-
ers will tend to be more affected by a change in the likelihood of 
prosecution than will those who base their decisions on expected 
value because the likelihood of catastrophic losses is more affected 
by such a change than is the value of expected losses. 60 A numeri-
cal example illustrates this point. Suppose an offender faces a SO 
per cent chance of 1 and a SO per cent chance of 2 prosecutions 
against him in a given period. For each prosecution, he faces a 33 
48. Such an offender would be more reflective than, say, an ax murderer, but 
crimes of passion seem in general to possess the evidentiary problem and thus are not 
included within this analysis. 
49. "Expected value" is a statistical term meaning, roughly, the "average" prospect 
in a situation. If I engage in a coin-flipping game where I win $1 if the coin comes 
up heads and lose $1 if it comes up tails, the expected value of the game is 1/z times 
1 minus ½ times 1 equals 0. The expected value of the game is that I will break 
even. There is a risk, however, that I will lose. 
50. Strictly speaking, this is true only for distributions, like the normal one, that 
have low frequencies at the extremes and higher ones near the median. But intuition 
suggests that this is almost certainly the case here. It is considered to be the case in 
most social populations. 
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per cent chance of winning the suit, .a 33 per cent chance of settling 
for half of the plaintiff's damages; and a 33 per cent chance of losing. 
For the sake of simplicity, litigation costs are ignored and losses are 
measured as 0, 5, and 10, respectively. Thus the offender faces a 
probability distribution of his possible losses. There is roughly a 22 
per cent chance -that he loses nothing during the period, and a 5¼ 
per cent chance that he loses 20. The expected value of his losses 
is 7¼.151 Suppose the chance of prosecution goes up so that there 
is a 50 per cent chance of two suits and a 50 per cent chance of 
three. The chance of losing 20 or more has risen to 24 per cent, 
or an increase by a factor of 4. The expected loss value, however, 
has risen only 67 per cent, to 12¼. The implications of this dif-
ference are clear. A risk averse party, one who bases his actions 
primarily on the chance of losing a large amount (20 in this case), 
will be affected by the change in prosecution far more than one who 
simply relies on expected values. Thus, more deterrence results 
from an incremental increase in the probability of prosecution where 
offenders for a particular offense are risk averse. 
Recent economic literature convincingly shows that large corpo-
rations are typically risk averse.52 In The New Industrial State, Gal-
braith argues that the large industrial corporation is impelled by the 
large capital investments and long lead time required by modern 
technology to plan accurately far ahead and to keep uncertainty to 
a minimum. 53 Large losses and surprises cannot be tolerated be-
cause adjustments to deal with them cannot be made on short notice. 
The Galbraith argument suggests that, because the termination of 
a loss-incurring program might be slow and costly, a large firm will 
be averse to a program that might engender a large number of losing 
suits. Robin Marris concludes that large corporations are risk averse 
on the ground that corporate managers, motivated primarily by their 
own survivial, run corporations to minimize the danger of large losses 
and thus takeover bids: they fear the chance of severe losses much 
more than they desire big gains. 54 
It may also be true that risk aversion varies among individuals 
according to their income levels. One who is poor may be a risk 
preferrer because he has very little to lose and the bankruptcy and 
welfare laws limit the consequences of his failures. On such an in-
dividual, an incremental increase in the probability of prosecution 
may have little effect. 
51. Disregarding, of course, the offender's earlier gains from offending. 
52. See, e.g., K. BOULDING, RECONSTRUCTION OF ECONOMICS 26-38 (1950); Gra-
bowski & Mueller, Managerial and Stockholder Welfare Models of Firm Expenditures 
in REv. EcoN. STAT., Feb. 1972, at 9-20. 
53. See J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 11-178 (1967). 
54. R. MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL" CAPITALISM 29-45 
(1964). 
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The fourth factor affecting Pd is a simple one. Pd is the dimin-
ished probability of an offender's continuing to offend. If an of-
fender acts once, from impulse or for peculiar reasons, and is un-
likely to repeat, Pd may be small simply because there will be little 
likelihood of repetition even without prosecution. Thus, whether 
the average offender for a particular offense is a habitual one influ-
ences Pd, 
The final factor -affecting Pd is the moral seriousness of the of-
fense. The responsiveness of offenders to a change in the probabil-
ity of prosecution should vary inversely with this factor. If an of-
fense is considered highly reprehensible, most people will be barred 
by their ethical beliefs from committing it and a small change in the 
expected costs of offending will not affect their decisions. But, if 
an offense is viewed as having little moral significance, many will 
base their decision whether to offend on the chance of prosecution. 
It is -at this point possible, after analyzing the five main factors 
that influence deterrence, to list the characteristics that make an of-
fense most suitable for governmental prosecution. An offense is an 
attractive one for governmental prosecution if (1) there are a large 
number of potential offenders, (2) each offender commits a large 
number of offenses, (3) offenders are large, active, and financially 
able to gather information, (4) offenders are reflective or commit of-
fenses in the regular course of business, (5) offenders are risk 
averse, as are large businesses and perhaps individuals in upper in-
come brackets, (6) the offense is not one that is particularly morally 
reprehensible, and (7) the offense involves complicated trials with 
complex issues of law and fact and thus leads to high litigation costs. 
While various offenses will rate differently on this list of consid-
erations, the list does seem to single out as the most suitable for gov-
ernmental prosecution those offenses that are committed frequently 
by a large number of financially strong businesses, expensive to liti-
gate, and not morally reprehensible. The prosecution of such of-
fenses will create large external benefits and will thus have a low 
BP/Be ratio, which means that, absent government intervention, the 
market will allocate considerably less than the optimal amount of re-
sources for prosecution. 
Yet, as noted above, governmental misallocation is greatest for 
offenses that are committed by large businesses and that are not 
morally reprehensible, which means that governmental misallocation 
is severe for many of the offenses for which market misallocation 
is great. In the antitrust area, for example, where offenders are 
principally large corporations and the offense not particularly morally 
reprehensible, governmental misallocation is evidenced by the ap-
parent forestalling of a number of justice department prosecutions 
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due to corporate political influence. 55 Thus, the fact that an offense 
is morally neutral and committed primarily by large corporations 
does not automatically mean that government will allocate resources 
to the prosecution of the offense more accurately than the free mar-
ket will. The determination that the market will misallocate re-
sources for the prosecution of a particular offense must therefore be 
followed by a balancing of the relative inefficiencies of governmental 
and market production. 
An alternative to governmental prosecution of offenses that will 
be under-prosecuted by the free market is governmental subsidiza-
tion of private prosecution. 56 A subsidy program would only in-
crease private prosecution. Even if the decision concerning the 
amount by which prosecutions should be subsidized were influenced 
by politically oriented offenders, a subsidy program would not aug-
ment existing market underallocation. Thus, while governmental 
misallocation renders it impossible to determine whether, for a par-
ticular offense, governmental prosecution would be better than pri-
vate prosecution, governmental misallocation does not affect the de-
cision whether an offense is an appropriate one for governmental 
subsidization. It is therefore possible to state that an offense insuffi-
ciently prosecuted in the market, like an offense involving large busi-
ness offenders, is a strong candidate for governmental subsidization. 
Five common offenses can at this point be ranked according to 
their relative suitability for market prosecution and governmental 
subsidization of private prosecution. While -the ranking will be 
rough and far from rigorous, it should serve to hint at what can be 
achieved by using the model here developed fortified by more em-
pirical knowledge. 
The five offenses considered are antitrust violations, manufactur-
ers' products liability offenses, interference with contract, sales 
fraud, and embezzlement. Sales fraud and embezzlement, and to 
some extent antitrust violations, are now prosecuted by the govern-
ment. An examination of the five offenses for the characteristics 
isolated above suggests that two of these three-sales fraud and em-
bezzlement-are not the most appropriate offenses for governmental 
prosecution or subsidization. 
Antitrust violations are the most appropriate of the five offenses 
for governmental action. Because violations are highly significant 
55. M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 30-47 (1972). 
56. The subsidy would be a bonus paid by the government to individuals who 
prosecuted successfully, and would be received by the individuals in addition to the 
damages awarded by the court. The size of the bonuses would roughly equal the 
external benefits from prosecution. A bonus equal to external benefits would mean 
that the successful prosecutor would receive an amount equal to all the benefits 
generated by the prosecution. Thus there would be sufficient inducement for the 
optimum amount of prosecution to be achieved. 
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in dollar terms, 57 there is an incentive for potential offenders to be 
well-informed as to the possibilities of prosecution. Potential vio-
lators are reasonably large. in number and are principally large 
firms58 that presumably expend a vast amount of resources on plan-
ning. Many potential offenders are therefore probably also risk 
averse. Antitrust violations characteristically take years and cadres 
of lawyers to prosecute; thus, litigation costs are high. Finally, anti-
trust violations are probably not regarded by the business community 
as immoral. 59 Because the antitrust laws and their justification are 
still a matter of controversy, it is reasonable to surmise that most 
potential offenders are willing to offend if the risks are small enough. 
Products liability offenses are second in terms of their propriety 
for governmental subsidization. The number of potential offenders 
is large, each is apt to commit a large number of offenses, and prob-
lems of proof may make the costs of litigation significant. More-
over, offenders risk the possibility of large losses since the costs of 
being prosecuted for products liability oftep. include enormous per-
sonal injury judgments. Thus, offenders have incentives to be well-
informed. Finally, products liability violations may possess little 
moral significance, principally because offenses are unintentional. A 
fim1 becomes an offender by using slightly less thorough manu-
facturing or testing procedures and accepting a slightly greater prob-
ability that defective products will be produced. Because there is 
always some finite probability of defectives, it is easy to consider 
such actions as morally neutral. Yet defective products often cause 
serious injuries. Some firms may thus take great care to avoid pro-
ducing defective goods whatever the chance of prosecution. The 
only factor that reduces the attractiveness of products liability of-
fenses for governmental action is the size of the potential offenders. 
While many of the offenders are apt to be large, aware of prosecu-
tion trends, reflective, and risk averse, many offenders may be small 
businesses with little risk aversion and little institutionalized plan-
ning. 
Little that is certain can be said with respect to the third offense, 
interference with contract. Presumably, few businessmen induce 
breaches of contract as a regular procedure and thus few have any 
real incentive for staying well-informed concerning the offense. 
While offenders will generally be businesses there is no a priori rea-
son to believe that any particular proportion are large corporations. 
57. Defendants are liable to private plaintiffs for treble damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15 
(1970). Remedies can also include divestiture. See United States v. Aluminum Co., 
91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Plainly a divestiture order can cause an offender 
significant damage. 
58. Cf. P • .AREEDA, .ANTITRUST ANALYSIS xxix-li (2d ed. 1974) (citing cases). 
59. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 158 (1970), 
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The offense is probably not considered highly immoral by many, al-
though some might avoid committing the offense on ethical grounds. 
There are a large number of potential offenders, but most offenders 
probably commit few offenses. Finally, the costs of litigation are 
normally not particularly high since contract actions are not among 
the more complex. In sum, interference with contract is not suited 
clearly for either market or governmental treatment, and is, accord-
ingly, ranked in a rough manner in the middle of the five offenses. 
The fourth offense, sales fraud, encompasses schemes specifi-
cally designed to sell tangible or intangible items under false pre-
tenses or in misleading ways. The offense is defined here to ex-
clude cases that involve ·the evidentiary problem. Offenders may be 
active on a large scale or they may be small operators who cannot 
afford to spend what is necessary to discover the chances of prosecu-
tion. Because offending is not part of a regular business, planning 
cannot be expected and, accordingly, offenders are not likely to be 
risk averse. Offenses are probably regarded as highly immoral. 
Thus, there will be few potential offenders on the margin of offend-
ing. Over-all, there are few external benefits flowing from a sales 
fraud prosecution, and therefore there is little reason for governmen-
tal prosecution or subsidization. 
Embezzlement, the final offense, has fewest of the characteristics 
•that make an offense an attractive candidate for governmental ac-
tion. There are probably few offenders active enough to make sys-
tematic information-gathering worthwhile.· Due to the nature of the 
offense, there are no large corporate offenders and offenses are not 
committed in the context of corporate decision-making. Because of-
fenses are generally viewed as highly immoral, the number of poten-
tial offenders is not high, although some offenders may be habitual 
or reflective. In sum, embezzlement, assuming that it does not pos-
sess the evidentiary problem, provides the weakest case for govern-
mental aid of any of the five offenses considered. Yet, along with 
sales fraud, it is the one predominantly prosecuted by the govern-
ment. 
This analysis suggests some changes in policy. Whether the gov-
ernment should intervene in -the prosecution of all these offenses or 
none of them is a question beyond the scope of this Note. But, if 
the above analysis has any validity, the present pattern of govern-
mental intervention seems improper to ·the extent that government 
does not focus on large corporate and business offenders committing 
morally neutral offenses. Extending and improving the approach 
used here could reveal more inconsistencies in public policy regard-
ing the agent of prosecution. 
